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Macro-Prudential Regulation 
ECMI Commentary No. 25/4 August 2009 
Avinash Persaud 
here is a widely held view that the current financial crisis resulted from an 
insufficient reach of regulation and that the solution is to take existing regulation 
and spread it without gaps across institutions and jurisdictions. If this were to be 
the main policy response, it would be a mistake for several reasons, the most important 
of which is that at the heart of the crisis lay highly regulated institutions in sophisticated 
jurisdictions—Northern Rock, IKB, Fortis, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, Citigroup. If 
there were no mortgage fraud, no tax secrecy, and no conflicts of interest, a crisis would 
still have occurred. And while risk did shift outside the capital adequacy regime, the 
special investment vehicles were not secret and supervisors had the discretion to look at 
how regulated institutions were managing risks and to respond if necessary.  
This is not the first international banking crisis the world has seen. Some estimates put 
it as the eighty-fifth.
1 If crises keep repeating themselves, it seems reasonable to argue 
that policymakers need to carefully consider what they are doing and not just “double-
up”. It also means that policymakers should not superficially react to the characters and 
colors of the current crisis. The last eighty-four crises occurred without credit default 
swaps and special investment vehicles. The last eighty-something had nothing to do 
with credit ratings. The solution to the crisis is not more regulation, though more 
comprehensive regulation may be required in some areas. Instead, it is better 
regulation—in particular, regulation with a greater macro-prudential orientation, as 
recommended by numerous recent official reports.
2  
What is macro-prudential regulation? 
It seems banal today to point out that the reason we try to prevent financial crises is that 
the costs to society are invariably enormous and exceed the private cost to individual 
financial institutions. We regulate to internalize these externalities in the behavior of 
such institutions. One of the main tools regulators use to do this is capital adequacy 
requirements. But the current approach to capital adequacy is too narrow. Capital 
                                                 
1 For a discussion on the history of financial crises, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
2 These include the April 2 communiqué of the G-20 leaders, the Turner Review (FSA 2009), the G-30 
report (2009), the de Larosiere Group report (2009), the UN Commission of Experts recommendations 
(2009), and the 11th Geneva Report (Brunnermeier and others, 2009). 
T 2 
adequacy levels are set on the implicit assumption that we can make the system as a 
whole safe by ensuring that individual banks are safe. This represents a fallacy of 
composition. In trying to make themselves safer, banks and other highly leveraged 
financial intermediaries can behave in ways that collectively undermine the system. 
This is in essence what differentiates macro-prudential from micro-prudential concerns.  
Here is an example of macro-prudential concerns. Selling an asset when it appears to be 
risky may be considered a prudent response for an individual bank and is supported by 
much current regulation. But if many banks do this, the asset price will collapse, forcing 
risk-averse institutions to sell more and leading to general declines in asset prices, 
higher correlations and volatility across markets, spiraling losses, and collapsing 
liquidity. Micro-prudential behavior can cause or worsen systemic risks. A macro-
prudential approach to an increase in risk is to consider systemic behavior in the 
management of that risk: who should hold it, and do they have the incentive to do so? If 
it is liquidity risk, is it in the interests of the system if all institutions, regardless of their 
liquidity conditions, sell the same asset at the same time? Risk in a financial system is 
more than an aggregation of risks in individual institutions; it is also about endogenous 
risks that arise as a result of the collective behavior of institutions.  
Macro-prudential regulation concerns itself with the stability of the financial system as a 
whole. By contrast, micro-prudential regulation, consisting of such measures as the 
certification of those working in the financial sector and rules on how financial 
institutions operate, concerns itself with the stability of individual entities and the 
protection of individuals. Micro-prudential regulation examines the responses of an 
individual bank to exogenous risks. By construction, it does not incorporate endogenous 
risk. It also ignores the systemic importance of individual institutions resulting from 
such factors as size, degree of leverage, and interconnectedness with the rest of the 
system.  
The existing framework of banking regulation was insufficiently macro-prudential and 
had been recognized as such by commentators for some time (see Borio 2005; Borio 
and White 2004; and Persaud 2000). Moreover, the emphasis on micro-prudential 
regulation may have contributed to the buildup of some macro risks.  
Through many avenues, some regulatory and some not, often in the name of prudence, 
transparency, and sensitivity to risk, the growing influence of current market prices has 
intensified homogeneous behavior in financial systems. These avenues include mark-to-
market valuation of assets; regulator-mandated market-based measures of risk, such as 
the use of credit spreads in internal credit models or price volatility in market risk 
models; and the increasing use of credit ratings, where the signals are slower moving 
but positively correlated with financial markets. Where measured risk is based on 
market prices, or on variables correlated with market prices, it can contribute to 
systemic risk as market participants herd into areas that appear to be safe.
3 And 
measured risk can be highly procyclical, because it falls in the buildup to booms and 
rises in volatile busts.  
                                                 
3 See Persaud (2000) for a discussion on how, through the financial sector’s use of value-at-risk models, 
“the observation of safety creates risk and the observation of risk creates safety”. The late economist 
Hyman Minsky also argued in more general terms, and long before the advent of value-at-risk models, 
that risks are born in periods of stability.  3 
Macro-prudential regulation and the cycle 
The economic cycle is a major source of homogeneous behavior, so addressing it is a 
critical macro-prudential concern. In the up phase of the cycle, price-based measures of 
asset values rise, price-based measures of risk fall, and competition to increase bank 
profits grows. Most financial institutions spontaneously respond by expanding their 
balance sheets to take advantage of the fixed costs of banking franchises and regulation; 
trying to lower the cost of funding by using short-term funding from money markets; 
and increasing leverage. Those that do not do so are seen as under leveraging their 
equity and are punished by stock markets. In the more prosaic words of Chuck Prince, 
former CEO of Citigroup, during an interview with the Financial Times in July 2007, 
“when the music is playing, you have to get up and dance.” By contrast, when the boom 
ends, asset prices begin to fall and short-term funding to institutions with impaired and 
uncertain assets or high leverage dries up. Forced sales of assets drive up their measured 
risk, and the boom inevitably turns to bust.  
One of the key lessons of this crisis is that market discipline is little defense against the 
macro-prudential risks that come with the economic cycle. The institutions that have 
been most resilient to the crisis, such as HSBC and J.P. Morgan, had lower equity 
“ratings” (lower price-earnings ratios) than those that proved to be less resilient, such as 
Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Fortis, and Lehman Brothers. Market discipline has an 
important role to play in the efficiency of the financial sector, but it cannot be on the 
front line of defense against crises.  
One reason that market discipline was seen as such an important pillar in the pre-crisis 
approach to banking regulation was the implicit model that regulators had in mind: 
financial crashes occur randomly as a result of a bad institution failing and that failure 
becomes systemic. The historical experience is rather different. Crashes follow booms. 
In the boom almost all financial institutions look good, and in the bust almost all look 
bad. Differentiation is poor. The current crisis is another instance of this all-too-familiar 
cycle. But if crises repeat themselves and follow booms, banning the products, players, 
and jurisdictions that were merely the symptoms of the latest boom will do little to 
prevent the next one.  
Moreover, the notion that some financial products are safe and some are not, and that 
the use of unsafe products is the problem, also looks suspect in a boom-bust world. The 
booms are often a result of things appearing to be safer than they are. Securitization was 
viewed as a way of making banks safer. Diversified portfolios of subprime mortgages 
were viewed as having low delinquency rates. Micro-prudential regulation is necessary 
to weed out the truly reckless institutions and behavior. But it needs to be supplemented 
with macro-prudential regulation aimed in part at acting as a countervailing force 
against the decline of measured risk in a boom (and thus excessive levels and 
interconnectivity of risk taking) and against the rise of measured risk in the subsequent 
collapse.  
Supervisors have plenty of discretion, but they find it hard to use because of the politics 
of booms. Almost everyone wants a boom to last. Politicians want to reap electoral 
benefit from the sense of well-being and prosperity during a boom. Policy officials 
convince themselves, and try to convince others, that the boom is not an unsustainable 
credit binge but the positive result of structural reforms that they have put into place. 
Booms have social benefits. They are associated with a higher appetite for risk and a 
perception that risks have fallen, and this often means greater access to finance for the 
previously unbanked and underinsured. Booms are not quite a conspiracy of silence, but 4 
there are few who gain from their early demise. So booms tend to be explained away, 
excused, and accommodated, allowing them to grow larger and larger and thus to cause 
more damage when they eventually collapse.  
Countercyclical charges and buffers 
In light of the observations above, there is a growing consensus around three ideas: 
Capital requirements need to have a countercyclical element in order to, in the words of 
the April 2 G-20 communiqué, “dampen rather than amplify the financial and economic 
cycle” by “requiring buffers of resources to be built up in good times.” There should be 
greater emphasis on rules rather than supervisory discretion to counterbalance the 
political pressures on supervisors. And these rules should include leverage limits and 
liquidity buffers.  
The references in the G-20 communiqué echo a statement by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision following its March 2009 meeting, recommending the 
“introduction of standards to promote the buildup of capital buffers that can be drawn 
down in periods of stress.” These statements by the G-20 and the Basel Committee, 
coupled with similar conclusions by other official reports, suggest that the argument in 
favor of macro-prudential regulation has been won. But how countercyclical capital 
charges and liquidity buffers are to be implemented has not yet been addressed in great 
detail. Given the politics of booms, the “how” is almost as important as the “whether.”  
In practical terms, Goodhart and Persaud have recommended that regulators increase the 
existing or base capital adequacy requirements (based on an assessment of inherent 
risks) by two multiples calculated using a few simple, transparent rules.
4  
The first multiple would be a function of the growth of credit and leverage. Regulators 
should meet with monetary policy officials (where they are separate) in a financial 
stability committee. This meeting would produce a forecast of the growth of aggregate 
bank assets that is consistent with the central bank’s target for inflation (or other 
macroeconomic nominal target). The forecast would have a reasonable band around it 
reflecting uncertainty. If a bank’s assets grow above this band, the bank would have to 
put aside a higher multiple of its capital for this new lending. If its assets grow less than 
the lower bound, it may put aside a lower multiple.  
For example, suppose that the financial stability committee concluded that growth in 
aggregate bank assets of between 7.5 percent and 12.5 percent was consistent with its 
inflation target of 3 percent. Growth in a bank’s assets by 25 percent, or twice the upper 
range, may lead to a doubling of the minimum capital adequacy level from 8 percent to 
16 percent of risk-weighted assets. A related approach is to have one minimum capital 
adequacy requirement for “bad” times and one that is twice that level for “good” times, 
with good and bad times being determined by bank profitability. Of course it is 
impossible to ascertain whether these capital levels would have made the system safe, 
but the consensus today is that they would have at least made it safer.  
Financial stability committees exist in many countries. But they generally work poorly 
because their deliberations have no consequence. Requiring such committees to agree 
on a sustainable level of growth in bank assets could make their work more penetrating 
and action oriented.  
                                                 
4 The original ideas were published in Goodhart and Persaud (2008a, b) and expanded in Brunnermeier 
and others (2009).  5 
The second multiple on capital requirements would be related to the mismatch in the 
maturity of bank assets and liabilities. One significant lesson of the crisis is that the risk 
of an asset is determined largely by the maturity of its funding. Northern Rock and other 
casualties of the crash might well have survived with the same assets if the average 
maturity of their funding had been longer. The liquidity of banks’ assets has fallen far 
more than the credit quality of those assets.  
If regulators make little distinction on how assets are funded, however, financial 
institutions will rely on cheaper, short-term funding, which increases systemic fragility 
and interconnectedness. This private incentive to create systemic risk can be offset 
through new capital or reserve requirements. It is partly this notion that the G-20 
communiqué refers to when stating that the G-20 leaders have agreed to introduce 
measures “to reduce the reliance on inappropriately risky sources of funding.” Liquidity 
buffers, with their size related to maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities, 
would have similar effect. But once again there is little discussion of methodology and 
implementation. Measuring the true maturity of bank assets and liabilities is not a 
straightforward exercise.  
In the framework set out in the Geneva Report (Brunnermeier and others 2009), assets 
that cannot be posted at the central bank for liquidity can be assumed to have a 
minimum maturity of two years or more. If a pool of these assets was funded by a pool 
of two-year term deposits, there would be no liquidity risk and no liquidity charge. But 
if the pool of funding had a maturity of one month and so had to be rolled over every 
month, the liquidity multiple on the base capital charge would be near its maximum—
say two, so the minimum capital adequacy requirement would rise from 8 percent to 16 
percent.  
In a boom in which the first countercyclical multiple is also two, the final capital 
adequacy requirement would be 32 percent of risk-weighted assets (8 percent x 2 x 2). 
Liquidity multiples would make lending costlier, since banks traditionally fund 
themselves short and lend long. But the liquidity multiples would give banks an 
incentive to find longer-term funding, and where they cannot do so, a liquidity buffer or 
liquidity reserve that could be drawn down in times of stress would buy time for 
institutions to deal with a liquidity problem.  
Can the cycle be measured? 
Many people, most notably former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
voice the concern that it is very hard to know when we are in a boom. Of course, 
measuring the cycle is what inflation-targeting central banks do on a daily basis. But 
this misses the point a little. If the purpose of countercyclical capital charges were to 
end boom-bust cycles, we would need to be more confident about the calibration of 
booms than we are today. But if the purpose is to lean against the wind, our calibrations 
can be less precise.  
Recall that without countercyclical charges, the natural inclination in a boom is to lend 
even more because measured risks fall. The pre-crisis regulatory approach took the 
economic cycle and amplified it. The goal instead should be to moderate the worst 
excesses of the cycle, not to kill it. Indeed, the cycle is an important source of creative 
destruction in our economic system.  6 
Valuation and mark-to-funding accounting 
Many commentators consider accounting issues to be central in the crisis. They argue 
that the use of fair-value accounting has added to the spiral of sales. But suspending 
fair-value accounting is not helpful in an environment made worse by uncertainty. 
Instead, financial institutions should complement mark-to-market accounting with 
mark-to-funding valuations (see Brunnermeier and others 2009).  
Under mark-to-funding valuations there are essentially two alternative prices for an 
asset: today’s market price and the discounted present value of the future earnings 
stream. In normal times these two prices are nearly the same. But in a liquidity crisis the 
market price falls substantially below the present value. If an institution has short-term 
funding, the realistic price to use is the market price. If it has long-term funding, the 
present-value price is a better measure of the risks faced by the institution. Under a 
mark-to-funding accounting framework a weighted average of the market price and 
present-value price would be used whose weights would depend on the weighted 
average maturity of the institution’s funding. The combination of liquidity charges and 
mark-to-funding value accounting would create incentives for institutions to seek 
longer-term funding and would encourage a tendency for illiquid assets to be owned by 
institutions with longer-term funding.  
At first sight, mark-to-funding would not appear to alleviate the problem facing banks 
today—in fact, it could make matters worse—because they have short-term funding. 
But this proposal would have had two ameliorating effects in the crisis. First, many of 
the bank-owned special investment vehicles that managed assets that were still 
performing from a credit point of view, but had become highly illiquid, had long-term 
funding. In the absence of fair-value accounting standards, they would not have joined 
the selling frenzy that compounded the crisis. Second, without the mark-to-market 
volatility, institutions with long-term funding would have been more willing to buy 
these assets. That would have provided greater price support, limiting the spiral of 
losses that endangered so many banking institutions.  
Compensation 
In the G-20 communiqué and elsewhere, great attention is placed on dealing with the 
incentives of individual bankers and traders. However, there are clear limits to how 
much governments should be involved in private firms’ decisions on executive pay. 
While measures to lengthen bankers’ horizons are necessary, greater hopes should be 
placed in macro-prudential regulation pushing banks to develop incentive packages that 
better promote through-the-cycle behavior. If that failed, however, regulators should 
certainly do more to address the important issue of incentives.  
Macro-prudential regulation beyond the cycle 
The other dimension of macro-prudential regulation is the cross-sectional one – namely, 
how to manage the buildup of risks arising from the structure of the financial system.   
Risk assignment 
Requiring the banking system to hold more capital on average will not improve the 
resilience of the financial system as a whole unless there is also a better match of risk 
taking to risk capacity. Indeed, piling up capital requirements may act as an 
anticompetitive barrier, reinforcing the specter of a few banks holding a government 
hostage because they are too big to fail. 7 
Micro-prudential regulation was often accompanied by a misguided view of risk as an 
absolute, constant property of an asset that can be measured, sliced, diced, and 
transferred. This is an elegant view of risk and has the merit of allowing banks to build 
highly complex valuation models and to sell highly complex risk management products 
to handle and distribute risk. But it is also an artificial construct that has little bearing on 
the nature of risk. 
In reality, there is not one constant risk. The three broad financial risks—credit risk, 
liquidity risk, and market risk—are very different. Moreover, the potential spillover risk 
from someone holding an asset depends as much on who is holding the asset as on what 
it is. Different holders have different capacities for different risks. The distinction 
between “safe” and “risky” assets is deceptive: one can do a lot of damage with a simple 
mortgage, for example. 
The capacity for holding a risk is best assessed by considering how that risk is hedged. 
Liquidity risk—the risk that an immediate sale would lead to a large discount in the 
price—is best hedged over time and is best held by institutions that do not need to 
respond to an immediate fall in price. A bank funded with short-term money market 
deposits has little capacity for liquidity risk. Credit risk—the risk that someone holding 
a loan will default—is not hedged by having more time for the default to happen but by 
having offsetting credit risks. Banks, with access to a wide range of credits, have a far 
greater capacity than most to diversify and hedge credit risks. 
The way to reduce systemic risk is to encourage individual risks to flow to where there 
is a capacity for them. Unintentionally, much micro-prudential regulation did the 
opposite. By not requiring firms to put aside capital for maturity mismatches and by 
encouraging mark-to-market valuation and daily risk management of assets by 
everyone, regulators encouraged liquidity risk to flow to banks even though they had 
little capacity for it. By requiring banks to hold capital against credit risks, regulators 
encouraged credit risk to flow to those that were seeking the extra yield, were not 
required to set aside capital for credit risks, and had limited capacity to hedge that risk. 
No reasonable amount of capital can remedy a system that inadvertently leads to risk-
bearing assets being held by those without a capacity to hold them. 
What can regulators do? They need to differentiate institutions less by what they are 
called and more by how they are funded. They should require more capital to be set 
aside for risks where there is no natural hedging capacity. This will draw risks to where 
they can be best absorbed. They also must work to make value accounting and risk 
management techniques sensitive to funding and risk capacity. Instead, under the 
current system, the natural risk absorbers behave like risk traders, selling and buying 
when everyone else is doing so. 
Capital requirements encouraging those with a capacity to absorb a type of risk to hold 
that risk not only will make the system safer without destroying the risk taking that is 
vital for economic prosperity; they also will introduce new players with risk capacities. 
This would both strengthen the resilience of the financial system and reduce our 
dependence in a crisis on a few banks that appeared to be well capitalized during the 
previous boom.  
Systemic institutions 
Not all financial institutions pose systemic risks. Regulation should acknowledge that 
some banks are systemically important, and others less so. In each country supervisors 
establish a list of systemically important institutions that receive closer scrutiny and 8 
require greater containment of behavior. Critical factors that determine systemic 
importance for an institution, instrument, or trade are size of exposures, especially with 
respect to the core banking system and retail consumers; degree of leverage and 
maturity mismatches; and correlation or interconnectivity with the financial system.  
In the past, interconnectivity has been understood to include issues such as payment and 
settlement systems, and these remain vital. Today, interconnectivity may also include 
institutions that behave in a highly correlated manner even if individually they appear 
small relative to the size of the financial system. 
Goodhart and Persaud, as members of the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of 
the International Monetary and Financial System, have urged the commission to 
recommend establishing a list of systemically important instruments. And where 
instruments are declared systemically important because of their volume, link to 
leverage, or interconnectivity, they recommend requiring that the instruments be 
registered and, where appropriate, exchange traded and centrally cleared.  
Host and home country regulation  
A gathering view is that financial institutions are global and so financial regulation 
needs to be global. But reality does not rhyme so easily. The crisis would not have been 
averted by more international meetings, and it has taught us that there is much that 
needs to be done at the national level to strengthen regulation. Countercyclical and 
liquidity charges cannot be set or implemented globally but need to be handled 
nationally in accordance with national cycles.  
Although there is a clear need for cross-border sharing of information and coordination 
of regulatory actions and principles (particularly in micro-prudential regulation), the 
setting of capital rules and banking supervision is likely to switch back from “home 
country” to “host country.” This should not be resisted because it would have two 
additional benefits, particularly for emerging economies. First, if foreign banks were 
required to set up their local presence as independent subsidiaries that could withstand 
the default of an international parent, it would reduce exposure to lax jurisdictions more 
effectively than trying to force everyone to follow a standard that could be inappropriate 
and would in any case be enforced with different degrees of intensity. Second, 
nationally set countercyclical charges could give common-currency areas or countries 
with fixed or managed exchange rates a much-needed additional policy instrument—
one that could provide a more differentiated response than a single interest rate could to 
a boom in one member state and deflation in another. This policy instrument may also 
be important in emerging economies, where, perhaps as a result of the absence of 
developed bond and currency markets, interest rates are not an effective regulator of the 
economic cycle.  
Conclusion  
Warren Buffett famously remarked that you see who is swimming naked only when the 
tide runs out. By this, he probably means that while fraud and unethical practices are 
going on all the time, they become visible only when the veil of rising market prices is 
removed. They are not the cause of the tide going out; they are merely revealed by it. 
We must continue to clamp down on fraud and ethical abuses and promote 
transparency, but this is not enough to avoid crises. We cannot avoid crises without 
avoiding the booms—booms that are always underpinned by a good story explaining 
why it is prudent for individual institutions to lend more. Micro-prudential regulation is 9 
not enough; it must be supplemented by macro-prudential regulation that catches the 
systemic consequences of all institutions acting in a similar manner. While we cannot 
hope to prevent crises, we can perhaps make them fewer and milder by adopting and 
implementing better regulation—in particular, more macro-prudential regulation.  
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